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1 Introduction
The increasing dominance of the marketplace in
security provisioning has been closely associated
with the current process of neoliberal
globalisation. This process, which picked up with
an unprecedented momentum at the turn of the
1980s, has seen a continuous restructuring of
global governance in such a way that the state is
no longer the only important actor in the quest
for development. A key component of this
restructuring has been the increasing
privatisation of services, which were traditionally
delivered publicly, by a plethora of non-state
actors. Yet states, conversely, have shaped the
process of globalisation in the historical search
for development through deliberate national
policies. The ongoing global financial and
economic crisis and the interventionist response
of US and European governments is a living
testament to this. The current global wave of
security privatisation, therefore, needs to be
explored and evaluated in the broader context of
development in which the globalising world order
has imposed a complexity of constraints on and
provided opportunities for public policy in the
quest for equitable security. This article focuses
on the implications of security privatisation for
poverty and inequality. Also considered is the
appropriate role of state actors, as leading agents
of development, within the structural limits of
globalisation.
The searches for security and the pursuit of
development have always gone hand-in-hand.
Although, historically, these two fields had been
artificially separated in scholarship, we are
increasingly seeing their remarriage over the last
decade or so. There is now an increasing
awareness among the very forces that previously
promoted international development that
security is not just a development issue but lies
at the core of development. This conviction is so
strong that it is now almost generally accepted
that there can be no development without
security (DFID 2002; World Bank 1999). Long
before the age of globalisation, inter-state war
and conflict were always driven by development
objectives. States went to war with each other
mainly because they, or their elites, sought to
advance their national development interests at
the international arena and they were
confronted with incompatible development
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interests of other states. In cases when (national)
security was pursued without factoring in the
economic implications, it has brought national
and global development woes, as seen in the
Vietnam War and the subsequent fiscal crisis of
the early 1970s in the USA (Payne 2005: 24–5).
We are now seeing the crisis of financial stability
in the USA, and in the rest of the world, closely
following behind the infamous 2003 invasion of
Iraq.
It is within this interconnectedness of security
and development that the privatisation of
security is assessed in this article. It argues that
although the state has undergone – and is still
undergoing – profound transformation in
response to structural changes brought about by
the process of globalisation, it has remained the
principal agency for development and security
among other new and emerging actors. Also, the
privatisation of security is considered here in its
broadest conception, embracing security
provided by both corporate and informal actors.
Private security is, admittedly, a phenomenon
that has coexisted with the evolution of the
modern state. However, the sheer scale and the
global reach of the ongoing wind of security
privatisation has prioritised it in public policy
and academic inquiry. Yet, while security
privatisation has generated enormous literature,
particularly since the 1990s, its link with the
issues of development, poverty and inequality,
crucial in grappling with the dilemmas of human
security, has not been sufficiently established, let
alone fully understood. In this chapter, an
attempt is made to explore these core
development concerns in relation to the
increased outsourcing of security to non-state
actors and what state actors can do to secure and
promote the wellbeing of vulnerable populations
within the global market order.
This article relies on theoretical analysis based
on instances from different parts of the world,
although most references are to developments
in Africa. It is hoped that its analysis will
contribute significantly to the setting of a robust
agenda of empirical and participatory inquiry
that would generate policy-relevant options for
transforming security institutions and practices
in a way that promotes security, not just for
state officials and the wealthy, but most
importantly, for the poor.
2 A brief survey of the literature
Private security arrangements are not a new
phenomenon. Indeed security has long been
provided privately even in some of the oldest
states. For example, the modern police did not
emerge in the UK until 1829, and before then,
policing was provided through quasi-official
agencies (Abrahamsen and Williams 2007: 133).
In the USA, vigilantism was a major instrument
for social ordering until the beginning of the
twentieth century (Brown 1976). In addition,
Zamparelli (1999) reminds us that the US
military has a long tradition of relying on private
security contractors, dating back to the Vietnam
War era. It is also known that the modern private
security industry dates back to the 1950s in the
USA and 1935 in the UK (Abrahamsen and
Williams 2007: 133), and that private guards in
the USA have been three times more in number
than the public police since the 1970s (Rosky
2004: 987). Yet, in spite of this history, we are
witnessing an unprecedented expansion of
security privatisation worldwide, with a scale and
impact that cannot be treated as normal.
Schreier and Caparini (2005: 44) have captured
some of the thorniest concerns around the
activities of modern private military and security
companies (PMSCs). Research on them has
tended to focus on the debate around the
controversial relationship between PMSCs and
mercenary activities, while informal security
actors as well as development issues of poverty
and inequality have been marginalised. The UN
(2007), for instance, asserted a close link
between PMSCs and mercenaries, while some
notable analysts on the subject see these
companies as the latter-day reincarnation of the
old mercenaries in corporate garb. Defined as
the ‘new mercenaries’ and ‘corporate warriors’,
which need to be reined in (Singer 2003; Mockler
1987; Musah and Fayemi 2002), PMSCs are
considered as a force for destabilisation in
conflict zones and dangerously undermining
human security generally. Particularly, they are
observed as agents of arms proliferation (Makki
et al. 1995: 1–2). However, more recently, the
presumed link with mercenary activities has
been perceived as more tenuous, and analyses
appear to be shifting towards the need to
separate the two in order to properly regulate
the security market while maintaining and
enforcing the international ban on mercenary
activities (FCO 2002; Holmqvist 2005; Gumedze
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2008). Making this separation has, however,
required a clear categorisation of the various
actors in the security market, and this has
resulted in a lingering definitional conundrum.1
While the search for definition and
categorisation continues, a few inquiries have
been made on the political economy of security
privatisation, which have some bearing on
development.
Avant (2005) has sought to challenge the
prevailing trend to preferring the market over
the state in determining the employment of
force around the world. In so doing, she helped
highlight some of the difficult trade-offs the
market has imposed on the scope of control by
the state. Another important analysis has
examined the role of private military companies
associated with powerful ‘oil-thirsty countries’
and multinational corporations in post-Cold War
wars that are linked with the international
political economy of oil in different parts of the
world (Kaldor et al. 2007). In Africa, combat-
active military companies have been linked to
the extractive industry and multinational
corporations operating in conflict and unstable
countries with abundant mineral resources
(Creutz 2006: 39), through which these
corporate actors have become involved in
resource wars (Shannon 2000: 105) and in
facilitating international trade in conflict goods
(Spear 2006).
These are useful efforts, which flag the
seriousness of broader issues of political economy
that attend the industry. Yet, as Abrahamsen and
Williams (2007: 131) indicate, such analyses tend
to concentrate on the ‘combat active private
military companies’ and that we need to shift
attention to other private actors. This is valid,
although it may be useful to add quickly that
some of the private security actors involved,
closely or distantly, in resource wars are not
necessarily hard-core military companies, and
that the private security industry is very slippery,
allowing for easy transmutation in the
relationship between the activities of
multinational businesses, the seemingly benign
security companies and the combat active
military versions in the cast of the Executive
Outcomes. One only has to take a closer look at
the conflict in the oil-rich Niger Delta in Nigeria
or consider the composition of some of the actors
involved in the failed bid to unseat the
government in Equatorial Guinea in 2004, to
appreciate this complexity.
Apart from their narrow focus, what is
noteworthy about the studies on security
privatisation is their failure for the most part to
touch upon the issues of development, poverty
and inequality. Sadly, very few tentative studies
link the private security market with conditions
of inequality and marginality. In a recent
examination of the industry in Uganda, Kirunda
(2008: 1) observes that the security market
promotes social stratification as companies
operate exclusively in urban centres and avoid
outlying areas where operational costs are
prohibitive. This logic also operates in Africa’s
major cities where crime shifts to the inner cities
as richer neighbourhoods are protected by
commercial security. This study highlights the
spatial distribution of security as a commodity
and forces us to think about the security of low-
income locations and regions that are not
attractive to markets. Also, given that the
majority of people living in rural and outlying
settings are, generally speaking, poorer than
those in the capitals and cities in Africa and
elsewhere, there is a need to inquire more into
the place of poverty and inequality in the market
for security. This becomes more urgent when one
considers that public policing in most of Africa is
also largely urban in focus (Hills 2000), and that
the market might exacerbate this inequality.
This leads to the second important concern of
this article: the security self-help mechanisms in
the marginal areas of our globalising market
order. Much literature has been generated on the
subject of vigilantism and other means of self-
help protection, and it is well known that where
the state does not adequately protect the poor
and their livelihoods, they have always relied on
security provided by informal actors (Scharf and
Nina 2001). What is needed is to locate the
informal security sector within the discourses of
equitable security governance and the
globalising market for security. A seminal effort
towards establishing this link has been made by
Ero (2000: 26), who sees vigilantes and local
militias as cheap, community-based elements of
the security market in search for security outside
formal state structures. Even though the issues
of poverty and inequality are not explicitly spelt
out, these insights draw attention to the
marginality of the informal security sector and
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its occupants and constitute a crucial starting
point for analysis.
3 Security governance in the age of globalisation
There is no doubt that we now live in a world
where our daily social experiences are being
shaped by powerful global dynamics which are
constantly unfolding. This process of
globalisation involves, essentially, what has been
described as the widening, deepening and
speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in
all aspects of contemporary social life (Held et al.
1999: 2), and this includes our security. It is
creating a structural order in which the state is
not always necessarily the single most important
actor. Although security has been provided
privately before and after the emergence of the
modern state, the golden age of the state
witnessed an intensive quest by national elites
for centralisation and public monopoly of the
means of legitimate violence for security
purposes. Security, therefore, increasingly
became a public good managed by sovereign
states in a world order, in which the pursuit of
public monopoly of security was a dominant state
strategy worldwide.
However, that world order was also characterised
by inequality such that the degree to which the
state succeeded in the centralisation and
monopolisation of security varied from country to
country, depending to a very large extent on
national material capabilities. This inequality
was well captured by early Development Studies
with the now exhausted ‘North–South’,
‘developed–developing countries’ intellectual
bifurcation of the world economic order.2
Managed by the hegemonic power of the USA,
and supported by the rich countries of Western
Europe and Japan, this order was also
characterised by the construction of ‘national
security states’ in rich countries and the
proliferation of localised wars and the
destabilisation of leftist regimes in new states
(Payne 2005: 24). In effect, the inequality of the
international economic order was reflected in
national security capabilities. However, even
though the public monopoly of legitimate
violence was not conclusively attained anywhere,
the state rose to be the central manager of
security.
The transition to a global world order, traced to
the end of US international hegemony as a result
of the financial crisis in that country from the
turn of the 1970s, and the associated world
economic crisis of the 1980s, undoubtedly set
back the centrality of the state in the overall
pursuit of development.3 Indeed, the
privatisation of security represents an important
aspect of this setback as the drive towards the
public monopoly of legitimate violence was
overtaken by globalisation in which the market
has emerged as a powerful alternative
mechanism for service delivery and imposed
structural limits to the scope of state policy. In
this context, the ascendancy of PMSCs and other
private actors in security governance has come to
be represented as an ‘inescapable’ reality of
globalisation which cannot be gainsaid, but one
with which the state has to live and negotiate the
shifting terms of authority. This thinking has
come to impose a neoliberal paradigm of security
governance, which entrenches global inequality
and endangers efforts towards equitable security.
This paradigm itself, not surprisingly, stemmed
from the early triumphalist interpretation of
globalisation. Presented by those whom Held et
al. (1999) refer to as the ‘hyperglobalisers’, this
interpretation sees globalisation as an
unstoppable one-way traffic embodying powerful
global forces, which shape all aspects of our
social life in a way that we cannot resist. This
neoliberal view was championed by notable
scholars, particularly Ohmae (1995), who were
quick to celebrate ‘the triumph of the market
over the state’, and hastily announced the ‘end of
the state’, which was seen as retreating so
precipitously that it has ceased to be analytically
relevant. This view exaggerates the influence of
structure over agency and sees globalisation as
deterministic. One of the most dangerous
fallouts of accepting globalisation as such, as has
been pointedly observed by Hay and Marsh
(2000), is that it can be instrumentalised by state
elites to promote acquiescence in security
policies and practices that favour their personal
interests. It is also insensitive to the issues of
social inequality accompanying globalisation,
and it is little wonder that the current paradigm
of security governance has tended to single out
the commercial component of security
privatisation at the expense of informal actors,
thus largely avoiding questions relating to
poverty and global inequality in security
governance.
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4 A neoliberal global order of unequal security
A brief examination of the normative structure
of globalisation is appropriate in order to clearly
understand the linkages of security privatisation
and social inequality. First, globalisation is hardly
as sacrosanct as we are being compelled to
accept. Second, a view that is increasingly being
imposed on our thinking is one which sees
contemporary security governance as a ‘network’
operating without a clearly defined centre but
rather composed of interlinked nodes, the state
being one of such nodes. The proliferation of
private security actors is thus taken as part of
this new ‘networked security governance’ in
which the state should no longer be conceived as
the central actor but one whose position within
the network varies according to time and space
(Johnston and Shearing 2003; Dupont 2004;
Abrahamsen and Williams 2007). The danger of
such thinking (and of the developments behind
it) is that we may no longer need a final arbiter
in the matters of security in our national
societies. It also implies that state policy should
give way to other mechanisms for security
delivery.
We cannot deny the ongoing construction of a
global system in which nearly all parts of the
world are increasingly being interlinked. Yet we
also need to note that this new global system
represents only a particular variant of
globalisation that has been rightly branded as
‘neoliberal globalisation’ (Scholte 2000). Another
critical assessment describes it as a ‘globalising
liberal political economy’ and questioned the
‘immutability’ representation by arguing that it is
possible for this order to be turned over into
another variant of globalisation in the course of
time or even that globalisation itself will be rolled
back (Payne 2005: 31–2). Globalisation,
therefore, did not just drop out of nowhere, but
rather it marks the ascendancy and climaxing of
neoliberal thinking and policies, consciously
promoted by powerful countries through
international financial institutions as their
preferred alternative route to development.
Williamson (1993) has described how the Reagan
and Thatcher administrations in the USA and
UK, respectively, as well as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank,
launched and shaped the triumph of the
neoliberal order through the so-called
‘Washington Consensus’. The current ‘bail-out’
interventions by the state in the USA and
Western Europe to rescue some of the biggest
banks and financial houses in the world from the
ongoing global financial crisis reminds us of the
influence of state agency in shaping globalisation.
The current global economic crisis also shows
that the current global order is not a ‘given’ but
rather a successful but temporary projection and
global expansion of national power and
development objectives by a few countries. As
aptly captured by Hurrell and Woods (1995:
447), this neoliberal version of globalisation is
driven by structural inequality among states in
terms of global ideology, access to and control of
international institutions, transnational private
actors as well as national material capability.
These inequalities need to be reflected upon
when examining the current privatisation of
security and its implications for development.
This is importantly so, not only at the global
level but also at the local, where informal
security provision starkly reveals the dire
condition of those who lack the ability to
purchase security and who live on the margins of
state protection. The notion of a new model of
security governance operating as an all-inclusive
network in which various actors are linked and
work together for a common goal hardly applies
in many societies or parts of society caught
between the state and the market. In such areas,
the network only operates as a dubious and an
exclusive contract between state and commercial
elites. Vigilantes, neighbourhood watches and
civil militias are, in most cases, excluded from
such governance networks. Where they have any
links to the state, such links only developed as an
emergency elite response to crisis, such as the
state collaboration with the Kamajor against the
rebel Revolutionary United Front in Sierra
Leone during that country’s recent civil war. In
most cases, any such linkages operate informally
through ‘elite capture’ and ‘political
instrumentalisation’ against domestic opponents.
Rather, it is the failure to integrate those left out
by the state and market into security governance
that has permitted their criminalisation or
metamorphosis into agents of political violence.
5 Conclusion: illiberal markets, security and
inequality
This last example also calls our attention to the
ever-present menace of market failure and the
primacy of the state in a globalising neoliberal
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order which promotes the market as the main
mechanism for shaping major social and political
decisions, including security decisions. Security is
a crucial dimension of social life for the
unemployed or underemployed and is an area
where the failure of the market needs to be
addressed.
The relationship between globalisation and global
inequality has remained a very controversial issue.
It has generated an ongoing academic debate,
which may not be resolved quickly (Wade and
Wolf 2002). However, while the debate rages on,
the privatisation of security continues to expand
in close association with global inequality of access
to security and justice. The globalisation of
markets itself is characterised by contradictions in
which, as Hoogvelt (1997) rightly observes, some
societies are increasingly being integrated while
others are being marginalised from the
mainstream of economic prosperity. The
coexistence of the commercial and informal
sectors of security demonstrates a key aspect of
these contradictions in which the more wealthy
segments of society are protected through the
market, while the poorer rural dwellers and those
who live in the squalor of inner cities are left to
their own devices.
In this sense, it can be seen that while the
market system promises to be free, in reality, it
fosters injustice and fails to promote equal
opportunity for all, hence the use of ‘illiberal
markets’ (Rothkopf 2008: 63). The informal
security sector does not provide sustainable
security, being haphazard and vulnerable to elite
capture, politicisation or criminalisation, as has
occurred in such places as Nigeria, South Africa
and the Philippines (Isima 2007: 230–47;
Kowalewski 1991), and therefore cannot be
ignored. Moreover, informal security operates
within communities through an organic
relationship, which state security forces often
lack, not least because of their colonial roots.
Bringing in the informal is therefore the
beginning of wisdom for security governance in
poor countries where both state and market have
failed to provide adequate security. In such
contexts, there is a need to rethink the entire
neoliberal conception of the ‘security sector’.
This may start with the mapping of informal
security forces across the globe and their
relationship to global inequality as well as their
place in security governance.
Fundamental rethinking is needed on the role of
the state in security governance, based on the
recognition that states can and do shape the
direction of privatisation, particularly in the field
of security. The goal of equitable security must
be seen as a component of national development
strategies, and the state has to assume central
responsibility (of course within the framework of
sound democratic principles) in protecting poor
communities.
Such rethinking also, however, needs to recognise
the structural inequalities of power and wealth
which impose limitations on the capacity of
developing countries to pursue and deliver to
their citizens their preferred development
strategies. It means such assessment has to take
place within the context of the wider global
order in order to identify the mechanisms
available to national actors for adjusting the
objectives of their national development
strategies in ways that supports the goal of
equitable security.
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Notes
1 For most existing typologies and the problems
of categorisation, see Schreier and Caparini
(2005: 33–43).
2 This bifurcation has been challenged for its
gross inadequacy to capture the complexities
of actual contemporary international politics
of coalition building and dismissed as
hegemonic representation. See Payne (2005:
231–46) and Bilgin and Morton (2002).
3 See Payne (2005: 24–6) for detailed accounts
of these developments.
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